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Thermodynamic susceptibility as a measure of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas
Colin Benjamin∗ and Aditya Dash†
School of Physical Sciences, National Institute of Science Education and Research, HBNI, Jatni-752050, India
The emergence of cooperation in the thermodynamic limit of social dilemmas is an emerging field
of research. While numerical approaches (using replicator dynamics) are dime a dozen, analytical
approaches are rare. A particularly useful analytical approach is to utilize a mapping between the
spin-1/2 Ising model in 1-D and the social dilemma game and calculate the magnetization, which
is the net difference between the fraction of cooperators and defectors in a social dilemma. In
this paper, we look at the susceptibility, which probes the net change in the fraction of players
adopting a certain strategy, for both classical and quantum social dilemmas. The reason being,
in statistical mechanics problems, the thermodynamic susceptibility as compared to magnetization
is a more sensitive probe for microscopic behavior, e.g., observing small changes in a population
adopting a certain strategy. In this paper, we find the thermodynamic susceptibility for reward,
sucker’s payoff and temptation in classical Prisoner’s Dilemma to be positive, implying that the
turnover from defect to cooperate is greater than vice-versa, although the Nash Equilibrium for the
two-player game is to defect. In classical Hawk-Dove game, the thermodynamic susceptibility for
resource suggests that the number of players switching to Hawk from Dove strategy is dominant.
Entanglement in Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma (QPD) has a non-trivial role in determining the
behavior of thermodynamic susceptibility. At maximal entanglement, we find that sucker’s payoff
and temptation increase the number of players switching to defect. In the zero-temperature limit,
we find that there are two second-order phase transitions in the game, marked by a divergence in
the susceptibility. This behavior is similar to that seen in Type-II superconductors wherein also two
second-order phase transitions are seen.
Keywords: Ising Model; Nash Equilibrium; Susceptibility; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Hawk-Dove Game; Quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma
This work aims to define and interpret the role
of thermodynamic susceptibility in social dilem-
mas in the infinite player limit. It relies on a map-
ping of the social dilemma game to the spin-1/2
Ising model. Magnetization of the game provides
the difference between fraction of cooperators and
defectors in the game. Susceptibility, on the other
hand, provides the difference between the rate of
change in the fraction of cooperators or defectors
in response to a change in payoffs. In this pa-
per, we calculate the thermodynamic susceptibili-
ties for the classical games of Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Hawk-Dove and the quantum game of Quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Analogous to magnetic sus-
ceptibility, the susceptibilities for the game are
much more sensitive in detecting changes in frac-
tion of cooperators or defectors in response to
change in payoffs. We identify phase transitions
in social dilemmas by looking at susceptibility
plots. Temperature in a social dilemma plays
a role so as to randomize the strategy selection
by the players. Zero temperature corresponds
to zero randomness while infinite temperature
corresponds to complete randomness. Our main
results are that the thermodynamic susceptibil-
ity for reward, sucker’s payoff and temptation in
classical Prisoner’s Dilemma are positive, imply-
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ing that the turnover from defect to cooperate is
greater than vice-versa, although the Nash Equi-
librium for the two-player game is to defect. In
the case of Hawk-Dove game, we find that change
in resource value increases the number of players
switching to Hawk, while change in injury cost
aids in the change in players to Dove. In the
case of quantum prisoner’s dilemma in thermo-
dynamic limit, we find that entanglement plays a
crucial role. At maximal entanglement, we find
that sucker’s payoff and temptation both promote
the transition to defect in the game, while reward
and punishment do not affect the transition in
the game. In the zero temperature limit, we find
that there are two second-order phase transitions
in the game, namely from an all classical phase
to a mixed phase where the number of classical
and quantum strategy players are equal, and from
the mixed phase to a quantum phase, which are
clearly identified by the divergence in the suscep-
tibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social dilemma games involve interactions between
intelligent rational decision makers. Each participant
(player) in the game attempts to maximize his/her own
payoffs, which may lead to conflict, although on many oc-
casions, cooperation may be more rewarding. The major
aim in any social dilemma is to obtain the Nash equilib-
2rium, a set of strategies to be selected by each player,
so as to avail least loss or maximum gain for all players.
In addition to Nash Equilibrium, there may also exist
Pareto optimal strategies which could provide a better
outcome. Such a situation is best represented by the clas-
sic Prisoner’s dilemma, in which the Nash equilibrium for
players is to defect, but they will receive a better payoff
if they cooperate among themselves, which is the Pareto
optimal strategy [1].
There are many real life examples where number of
players involved in the game may be very large. For ex-
ample, decision making process for a country involves
accounting of choices made by each citizen which may
number in millions. In these situations, looking at so-
cial dilemmas in the thermodynamic limit makes sense.
A method for modeling social dilemmas in the thermo-
dynamic limit by establishing a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the payoffs of a general bi-matrix symmet-
ric game with an appropriate exactly solvable statistical
1D Ising) has been attempted before[2]. The mapping
provides the equivalent of the ”J” and ”h” parameters
for the social dilemma in terms of payoff matrix. Fur-
ther, this mapping enables an analytic expression for the
difference between number of cooperators and defectors,
which is a welcome alternative to the numerical experi-
ments mostly done to approach the thermodynamic limit
of social dilemma games. These ”J” and ”h” parameters
are then substituted in the thermodynamic functions like
magnetization and susceptibility to generate the equiva-
lent magnetization or susceptibility for social dilemmas
in thermodynamic or infinite player limit. Magnetization
in Ising model, defined as the difference between fraction
of spin up (↑) and spin down (↓) sites, is then for a so-
cial dilemma defined as the difference between fraction
of players opting to cooperate versus fraction of players
opting to defect. Apart from magnetization, there are
other thermodynamic functions of interest that can be
calculated from the Ising Model. One such function is
the susceptibility, which provides the response of magne-
tization to a change in the external magnetic field.
In magnetic systems, susceptibility provides a much
more sensitive way to measure small changes in mag-
netic moment of a system at high external fields [3].
In this paper we look at the social dilemma equivalent
of the susceptibilities which provides us with fraction of
players switching between strategies and its implications
for infinite player or thermodynamic limit of Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Hawk-Dove Game and Quantum Prisoner’s
Dilemma(QPD). The susceptibilities in social dilemmas
are defined with respect to each of the payoffs. In our
work, we find that susceptibilities for reward, sucker’s
payoff and temptation in classical Prisoner’s Dilemma
are positive, indicating that the number of players chang-
ing from defect to cooperate increases as a function of
these payoffs. In classical Hawk-Dove game, increasing
resource leads to increase in the turnover of players to
Hawk while increasing injury cost leads to increase in
turnover of players to Dove. For QPD, at partial entan-
glement, reward aids in the transition to quantum strat-
egy while punishment aids in the change to defect. At
maximal entanglement, sucker’s payoff and temptation
aid in increasing the switch to defect. In the zero temper-
ature limit, we find that the QPD has two second-order
phase transitions at entanglement values of γ1 and γ2,
which mark the phase transitions from a classical phase
to a random phase, and from a random phase to a quan-
tum phase. These can be easily identified by the diver-
gence in the susceptibility at two entanglement values of
γ1 and γ2. At finite temperatures, the random phase dis-
appears and a single phase transition at γ0 occurs. The
phase diagram of QPD in thermodynamic limit is akin
to the phase diagram of a type-II superconductor[4, 5].
This paper has the following layout. First, we intro-
duce the spin-1/2 Ising model and derive the expression
for magnetic susceptibility. Then we map Ising model
to a generic social dilemma game and then derive ex-
pressions for the susceptibilities for each payoff. We then
interpret the game susceptibility in thermodynamic limit
of classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, classical Hawk-Dove and
Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finally, we end with con-
clusion.
II. SPIN-1/2 ISING MODEL AND MAPPING
TO A GENERAL SOCIAL DILEMMA GAME
A. Spin-1/2 Ising model in 1D
The 1D Ising model consists of half-integer spins which
can take values ±1. Spins only interact with their nearest
neighbors via coupling (J) and all spins are subject to
an uniform external magnetic field (h). The model is
described by a Hamiltonian as-
H = −J
N∑
i=1
SiSi+1 − h
N∑
i=1
Si, (1)
where Si is the spin at site i and N is the number of
spins in the chain. The corresponding partition function
for 1-D Ising Hamiltonian in (1) is
Z =
∑
S1,S2,...SN
eβ(J
∑N
i=1 SiSi+1+h
∑N
i=1(Si+Si+1)/2), (2)
with β = 1kBT representing inverse temperature and kB
is Boltzmann constant while T is the temperature. To
evaluate sum over all spins in the partition function, we
utilize transfer matrix method [6]. A detailed explana-
tion for same is given in [7, 8]. A transfer matrix V can
be defined with its elements as
V (Si, Si+1) = e
β(JSiSi+1+h(Si+Si+1)/2). (3)
3The transfer matrix V for a two spin Ising system can
then be written as
V =
[
V (1, 1) V (1,−1)
V (−1, 1) V (−1,−1)
]
=
[
eβ(J+h) e−βJ
e−βJ eβ(J−h)
]
(4)
The full partition function in terms of transfer matrix
elements V (Si, Si+1) can then be calculated for N -spin
case as-
Z =
∑
S1,...,SN
N∏
i=1
V (Si, Si+1) (5)
Here, we assume that model has periodic boundary con-
ditions, i.e. SN+1 = S1. The transfer matrix V has the
property[7],∑
S2
V (S1, S2)V (S2, S3) = V
2(S1, S3), (6)
We will utilize the eigenvalues of V to compute magne-
tization and subsequently susceptibility of Ising model.
Eigenvalues of V from Eq. (4) are
λ± = eβJ
(
cosh(βh)±
√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
)
. (7)
One can see that condition λ+ > λ− always holds. Using
Eq. (6), we evaluate the partition function by summing
over all spins. Thus,
Z =
∑
S1
V N (S1, S1) = Tr
(
V N
)
. (8)
By using properties of the trace of a matrix, partition
function can be written in terms of eigenvalues as
Z = λN+ + λ
N
− = λ
N
+
(
1 +
(
λ−
λ+
)N)
. (9)
Second term of Eq. (9) vanishes in the thermodynamic
limit, i.e., N →∞. This gives
Z = λN+ . (10)
To derive magnetization of Ising model, we begin with
the expression of free energy per spin (F ) for Ising model
F = −
1
βN
lnZ. (11)
In thermodynamic limit (N → ∞), the free energy sim-
plifies to
F = −
1
β
lnλ+. (12)
The average net magnetization is then
m = −
∂F
∂h
=
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
. (13)
Magnetization provides the difference between fraction of
up and down spins in Ising chain, i.e., m = n↑ − n↓ and
is shown in Fig. 1(a). Susceptibility χ is then defined as
the derivative of magnetization in (13) with respect to
the external magnetic field h, or
χ =
∂m
∂h
(14)
Susceptibility is a response function which provides the
turnover of up spins or down spins as function of external
magnetic field. Since sum of fraction of up and down
spins in the chain is n↑ + n↓ = 1, we have
χ = 2
∂n↑
∂h
, (15)
where n↑ is the fraction of up spins in chain. We have
plotted both magnetization and susceptibility of the 1D
Ising model in Fig. 1.
B. Thermodynamic limit of social dilemma games
Consider a general bi-matrix symmetric game G given
as:
G =

 s1 s2s1 a, a′ b, b′
s2 c, c
′ d, d′

 , (16)
where G(si, sj) is the payoff function with a, b, c, d as
row player’s payoffs and a′, b′, c′, d′ are column player’s
payoffs and s1, s2 are the strategies available to players.
To make a one-to-one correspondence of the payoffs with
Ising model we require a set of transformations to payoffs.
The transformations of payoffs are as follows [2]:
G =

 s1 s2s1 a+ λ, a′ + λ′ b+ µ, b′ + λ′
s2 c+ λ, c
′ + µ′ d+ µ, d′ + µ′

 . (17)
where λ, λ′, µ, µ′ are the transformations to payoffs.
These transformations do not alter the Nash equilibrium
of game (See appendix of [1, 9, 10] for a general proof).
Choosing the transformations as λ = −a+c2 , λ
′ = −a
′+b′
2
and µ = − b+d2 , µ
′ = − c
′+d′
2 and since game is symmetric,
payoff matrix in (Section II B) is
G =

 s1 s2s1 a−c2 , a−c2 b−d2 , c−a2
s2
c−a
2 ,
b−d
2
d−b
2 ,
d−b
2

 . (18)
Next, we map the two player, two strategy social dilemma
game to a two spin Ising model. The Ising Hamiltonian
4Figure 1: Plot of (a) magnetization(m) and (b) susceptibility(χ) for 1D Ising model as function of external magnetic
field for different temperatures with J = 1 and T = (βkB)
−1.
with two spins is
H = −JS2S1 − JS1S2 − h(S1 + S2) = E1 + E2. (19)
S1, S2 are spins at site 1 and 2 respectively. The energy
at those two sites are then
E1 = −JS1S2 − hS1 ; E2 = −JS2S1 − hS2 (20)
In order to map the 1D Ising model to the game as per
recipe given in[9–11], it is important to note that in Ising
model, we have to minimize energy to obtain the equi-
librium, in game theory, in contrast, Nash equilibrium
is obtained by maximizing the payoffs. Hence, to map
these two models, we consider the negative of energy,
i.e., ” − E”, where E is total energy in the Ising model.
The energies of the spin configurations in two spin Ising
model are written in matrix form as-
−E =

 S2 = +1 S2 = −1S1 = +1 J + h, J + h −J + h, J − h
S1 = −1 J − h,−J + h −J − h,−J − h

 .(21)
As in[11], equating (18) with (21), we get J + h = (a −
c)/2, J−h = (c−a)/2, −J+h = (b−d)/2 and −J−h =
(d − b)/2 and we obtain the relation between J, h and
a, b, c, d as -
J =
a− b+ d− c
4
; and h =
a− c+ b− d
4
. (22)
Utilizing this mapping, we obtain the game magnetiza-
tion mg, i.e., the difference between fraction of players
who have selected strategy s1 and strategy s2, analogous
to that of magnetization in Ising model, for a general so-
cial dilemma game in thermodynamic or infinite player
limit as
mg =
sinh
(
a+b−c−d
4T
)
√
e
−a+b+c−d
T + sinh2
(
a+b−c−d
4T
) , (23)
where T = (kBβ)
−1 is game temperature with kB being
Boltzmann constant and β being the inverse tempera-
ture. An important point to note is that the mapping
discussed here is between the Nash equilibrium of the
payoff matrix of a 2 × 2 symmetric non-zero sum game
(18) to a two spin Ising energy matrix(21). A successful
mapping would imply that the Ising two spin energy ma-
trix will now be called as an Ising two spin payoff matrix.
Thus we are not mapping the eigenvalues of the payoff
matrix(18) to the eigenvalues of the Ising two spin energy
matrix(21) but rather the Nash equilibrium of the payoff
matrix to the Nash equilibrium of the two spin Ising pay-
off matrix. In a separate work [10], one of us, has also
shown that an approach which purports to map eigen-
values of payoff matrix to eigenvalues of the Ising two
spin model leads to incorrect results in the appropriate
limits, since eigenvalues of payoff matrix do not corre-
spond to anything of relevance and importantly they do
not have any link to the Nash equilibrium. Further, our
sole aim being that with this mapping the fixed point,
i.e., ”Nash equilbrium“ remains unchanged. In this way
we get the fixed point of the two player game mapped to
the two spin Ising payoff matrix and thus via the ”J“ and
”h“ factors to the magnetization of the infinite spin Ising
model. The temperature T in social dilemmas is inter-
preted as amount of randomness allowed in selection of
strategies by players. T →∞ implies that players choose
their strategies at random while T → 0 implies that no
randomness is allowed in selection of strategies by the
players. One should note that the procedure outlined
here is restricted to only mapping the Nash equilibrium
of any social dilemma game to the spin-1/2 Ising model.
However, using this approach one cannot map the Pareto
optimum of the social dilemma game into the spin-1/2
Ising model. The reason being that extra terms (called
altruistic terms) have to be added to the Ising Hamilto-
nian to determine the Pareto optima but as mentioned
in Ref. [11] itself, this kind of Hamiltonian isn’t possible
and further there exists no clear interpretation of these
extra terms in statistical mechanics (see Ref. [11], sec-
5tions 4.2 & 4.3). In Ref. [11] it has been concluded that
addition of such terms implies the existence of either the
individual energies or the Hamiltonian, but not both to-
gether, thus we have refrained from including the Pareto
optima of the game in our analysis.
To derive game susceptibilities, we differentiate game
magnetization mg in Eq. (23) by the four payoffs to ob-
tain their respective susceptibilities. In general, there
will be four susceptibilities corresponding to each of four
payoff parameters a, b, c, d of the game as
χa =
∂mg
∂a
, χb =
∂mg
∂b
, χc =
∂mg
∂c
, χd =
∂mg
∂d
. (24)
Since mg = ns1 −ns2 , where ns1 and ns2 are the fraction
of players selecting strategy s1 and s2 respectively, and
ns1 + ns2 = 1, we can write the game susceptibility in
terms of fraction of players selecting a particular strategy
in response to change in payoffs as
χu = 2
∂ns1
∂u
(25)
where, u can be any of the payoff parameters and
ns1 is the fraction of players playing strategy s1. In
the following sections, we take a look at thermody-
namic susceptibilities in context of Prisoner’s dilemma,
Hawk-Dove game and finally the Quantum Prisoner’s
Dilemma(QPD).
III. PRISONER’S DILEMMA
A. Game magnetization in thermodynamic limit of
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner’s dilemma consists of two suspects who have
been caught by police and are being separately interro-
gated for their crimes. Each suspect has two choices, to
cooperate (C) with other suspect and not confess to the
crime or to defect (D) against other suspect and blame
him/her for the crime. The payoff matrix is
S =

 C DC r, r s, t
D t, s p, p

 , (26)
where r is reward, t is temptation, s is sucker’s payoff
and p is punishment with the condition on parameters
being t > r > p > s. The standard values for r, s, t, p
are r = 3, t = 5, s = 0 and p = 1 [12]. Of course, as
long as inequality t > r > p > s is respected, we can
vary the payoffs as 0 ≤ s < 1, 1 ≤ p < 3, 3 ≤ r < 5 and
t ≥ 5. The payoff matrix is understood as follows; payoff
of reward r implies a jail time of about 1 year, temp-
tation t implies no jail time for suspect. The sucker’s
payoff s implies a life term and punishment payoff p im-
plies a jail time of 10 years. It can be easily seen from
comparison of general payoff matrix(16) and payoff ma-
trix of Prisoner’s dilemma(26) that a = r, b = s, c = t
and d = p. Each suspect in this case is better off by de-
fecting, since if one player defects while other cooperates
then cooperating player will have a greater loss, hence
Nash equilibrium is to defect, irrespective of the other
player’s choice. But prisoners can definitely do better if
both of them choose to cooperate, hence the dilemma.
We get equivalent J and h parameters for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma from Eq. (22) as
J =
r − t+ p− s
4
and h =
r + s− t− p
4
. (27)
Thus, game magnetization which is effectively the
difference between number of cooperators(nC) and
defectorsnD, i.e., mg = nC −nD in thermodynamic limit
of Prisoner’s dilemma is
mg =
sinh
(
r+s−t−p
4T
)
√
sinh2( r+s−t−p4T ) + e
− (r−t+p−s)
T
. (28)
In case of Prisoner’s dilemma, the Nash equilibrium at
T → 0 gives mg → −1(see Eq. 28) implying nC =
0, nD = 1, i.e., all players regardless of whether they are
neighbouring or not choose exactly identical strategies,
which in this context is Defect. At T → ∞, mg → 0 as
players select their strategies at random, leading to equal
proportion of cooperators and defectors.
B. Thermodynamic Susceptibility in Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Following definition of susceptibility for general infi-
nite player game given in Section II B, we have four sus-
ceptibilities associated with each of four payoffs, namely
reward susceptibility χr, punishment susceptibility χp,
temptation susceptibility χt and sucker’s susceptibility
χs. The four susceptibilities are directly proportional to
the net change in number of cooperators as -
χa = 2
∂nC
∂a
, (29)
where a is one of the four payoff’s and nC is number of
cooperators. In the following sections, we address all four
susceptibilities.
Reward Susceptibility
The expression for reward susceptibility χr is
χr =
∂mg
∂r
=
e
s+t
T
(
2y + cosh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
))
4T
√
e
−p−r+s+t
T + y2
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
) ,
(30)
where y = sinh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
)
. In limit T → 0, χr → 0.
This is so because for T → 0, all players choose to de-
6fect while in limit T → ∞, χr → 0 as all players choose
their strategies at random. Hence, fraction of players in
switching their strategies is completely random and net
change is zero on average. Compared to game magnetiza-
tion (mg) in which nD > nC , regardless of the reward(r).
Game susceptibility (χr) changes sign, i.e.,
∂nC
∂r >
∂nD
∂r .
The plot in Fig. 2(b) depicts variation of reward
susceptibility as a function of reward r in Prisoner’s
dilemma. The number of players who switch their strate-
gies in response to change in reward is heavily dependent
on game temperature T . At lower game temperatures,
reward susceptibility is negative while at higher game
temperatures reward susceptibility can cross over to pos-
itive values, implying that the turnover of players from
defect to cooperate exceeds the turnover of players from
cooperate to defect. This positive value of susceptibility
implies that at higher game temperatures players are vul-
nerable to increase in reward. A small increase in reward
makes the players switch to cooperate. From Fig. 2(a),
the plot of game magnetization(mg), this isn’t obvious,
since mg < 0 always, irrespective of the reward. The
plot of game susceptibility(χr) show that players are al-
ways vulnerable to reward. Any increase in reward makes
them change faster to cooperate than to defect.
Punishment Susceptibility
Expression of punishment susceptibility χp is
χp =
∂mg
∂p
= −
e
s+t
T
(
cosh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
)
− 2y
)
4T
√
e
−p−r+s+t
T + y2
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
)
(31)
where y = sinh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
)
. In the limit of T → 0,
χp → 0 as all players choose to defect. From the two-
player case, it is evident that if any player switches to
cooperate, they face a loss. On the other hand, in
limit of T → ∞, we find that χp → 0, as all players
change their strategies at random, which leads to net
zero turnover of players, i.e., changing their strategies, on
average. The plot in Fig. 3(b) depicts variation of pun-
ishment susceptibility as a function of punishment p in
Prisoner’s dilemma. Punishment susceptibility is always
negative in response to change in punishment as shown in
Fig. 3(b), which implies that players prefer to switch to
defect. Like the game magnetization(mg), punishment
susceptibility(χp) also doesn’t change with response to
p, implying no further information is gained from the
susceptibility. Also, it can be observed that punishment
susceptibility diminishes as punishment increases since
most players choose defect, and hence the net fraction
of players who can switch to defect decreases. Any in-
crease in punishment in PD doesn’t lead to any change
in player’s behavior.
Temptation Susceptibility
The expression for temptation susceptibility χt is
χt =
∂mg
∂t
= −
e
s+t
T
(
2y + cosh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
))
4T
√
e
−p−r+s+t
T + y2
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
)
(32)
where y = sinh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
)
. In limit T → 0, χt → 0.
Here, in absence of any randomness in strategy selec-
tion, all players select Nash Equilibrium (Defect strat-
egy). Hence, net number of players switching their strate-
gies approaches zero. On the other hand, χt → 0 as
T →∞ as all players choose their strategies at random,
so net number of players switching their strategies is zero.
Unlike game magnetization (mg) versus t in Fig. 4(a), for
which nD > nC always, the game susceptibility has op-
posite sign, meaning ∂nC∂t >
∂nD
∂t thus the turnover to
cooperative behavior is greater due to change in temp-
tation. Thus at the macroscopic level while defectors
dominate regardless of temptation, for small changes in
temptation the turnover of players to cooperation always
increases. The plot in Fig. 4(b) shows variation of temp-
tation susceptibility as a function of temptation t. The
temptation susceptibility is always positive in response
to change in temptation, as in Fig. 4(b). This implies
that net fraction of players switching to cooperate strat-
egy is always more than the fraction switching to defect
strategy. This positive susceptibility results in overall
increase in number of cooperators in the game.
Sucker’s Susceptibility
The expression for sucker’s susceptibility χs is
χs =
∂mg
∂s
=
e
s+t
T
(
cosh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
)
− 2y
)
4T
√
e
−p−r+s+t
T + y2
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
)
(33)
where y = sinh
(−p+r+s−t
4T
)
. χs → 0 for both limits
of T → 0 and T → ∞. In limit of T → 0, we find
that players are unwilling to switch their strategies from
Nash Equilibrium without any randomness. In limit of
T →∞, players choose their strategies at random, so the
net number of players switching their strategies is zero.
Again similar to temptation, while at the macroscopic
level nD > nC as in Fig. 5(b). When looking at micro-
scopic changes to sucker’s payoff we see ∂nC∂s >
∂nD
∂s so
players are sensitive to change in sucker’s payoff, tending
to cooperate. Plot for sucker’s susceptibility as a function
of sucker’s payoff s is given in Fig. 5(b). Here, sucker’s
susceptibility is positive, implying that fraction of players
changing from defect to cooperate strategy is higher than
the fraction changing from cooperate to defect strategy.
This results in net increase in the number of coopera-
7Figure 2: Plots of (a) game magnetization mg, and (b) reward susceptibility χr versus reward payoff (r) for different
game temperatures T . Rest of payoffs are: t = 5, s = 0 and p = 1.
Figure 3: Plots of (a) game magnetization mg and (b) punishment susceptibility χp versus punishment payoff p for
different game temperatures T . Rest of payoffs, t = 5, s = 0, and r = 3
tors. Finally, in conclusion to this section, we dwell more
on “Temperature”. At zero temperature all players fol-
low the Nash equilibrium strategy which in Prisoner’s
dilemma is to defect. One can clearly see from Fig. 2(a),
as one lowers temperature T → low, the magnetization
mg → −1 implying all players defect. As temperature
increases, more and more players randomly switch from
defect to cooperate indicated by the magnetization (net
difference between cooperators and defectors) lowering
with increasing temperature. Randomness is relative to
the ordered state at T → low wherein all players are de-
fectors. The dependence of the game on temperature T is
one of the consequences of the mapping between payoffs
of the game and the Ising model.
IV. HAWK-DOVE GAME
Hawk-Dove Game is another well-known 2-player 2-
strategy game[1] in which two players contest over a
shared resource of value V . There is possibility of con-
flict which inflicts upon both an injury cost C with,
C > V > 0. Each player can have two possible strategies.
The players who adopt ”Hawk” strategy show aggressive
tendencies and are willing to fight over the resource even
at risk of injury. On the other hand, players adopting
”Dove” type behavior will not actively try to enter into
a conflict, instead, they will try to share the resource or
will back away at sign of danger. Denoting Hawk strat-
egy by H and Dove strategy by D, the payoff matrix[13]
of this game is
G =

 Hawk(H) Dove(D)Hawk(H) (V−C2 , V−C2 ) (V, 0)
Dove(D) (0, V ) (V2 ,
V
2 )

 . (34)
Comparing payoff matrix, Eq. (34) with general payoff
matrix Eq. (16), we have a = (V − C)/2, b = V , c = 0
and d = V/2. For this game there are two pure strategy
Nash Equilibria: (H,D) and (D,H) and a mixed strategy
Nash Equilibrium (σ, σ), where σ = p.H + (1 − p).D,
with p = VC being probability of displaying ”Hawk” like
behavior. Similar to Prisoner’s dilemma, we map ”Hawk-
Dove Game” to Ising model in the thermodynamic limit.
8Figure 4: Plots of (a) game magnetization mg and (b) temptation susceptibility χt versus temptation payoff t for
different game temperatures T . Rest of payoff’s are p = 1, s = 0 and r = 3.
Figure 5: Plots of (a) game magnetization mg and (b) sucker’s susceptibility χs versus sucker’s payoff s for different
game temperatures T . Rest of payoff’s are t = 5, r = 3 and p = 1.
The corresponding transformations are λ = −V−C4 and
µ = −3V4 as explained in Section II B. The payoff matrix
for row player after transformation becomes
G =

 Hawk(H) turn(D)Hawk(H) V−C4 V4
Dove(D) −V−C4 −
V
4

 . (35)
The +1 spin state is mapped to ”Hawk” strategy while
−1 spin is mapped to ”Dove” strategy. From Ising game
matrix Eq. (21), we have ’J ’ and ’h’ factors for the Hawk-
Dove game as
J =
−C
8
and h =
2V − C
4
. (36)
The game magnetization calculated from Eq. (23) for
Hawk-Dove game is then
mg =
sinh
(
2V−C
4T
)
√
sinh2
(
2V−C
4T
)
+ e
C
2T
. (37)
At T → 0, mg → 0, signifying that fraction of Hawks and
Doves are equal due to nearest neighbor players selecting
opposite strategies to minimize their losses. At T → ∞,
mg → 0 as all players choose their strategies at random,
which leads to players selecting Hawk and Dove in equal
proportion.
A. Thermodynamic Susceptibility in Hawk-Dove
Game
The game susceptibilities for Hawk-Dove Game are cal-
culated from game magnetization Eq. (37) as
χV =
∂mg
∂V
and χC =
∂mg
∂C
, (38)
where χV is resource susceptibility and χC is cost sus-
ceptibility. Further, using mg = nH − nD, where nH
and nD are fraction of players selecting Hawk and Dove
strategies respectively, and as nH + nD = 1, we express
9Figure 6: Plots of (a) game magnetization mg and (b) resource value susceptibility χV versus resource value V for
different game temperatures T , with cost of injury C = 4.
Figure 7: Plots of (a) game magnetization mg and (b) injury cost susceptibility χC versus injury cost C for different
game temperatures T , with resource value V = 2.
the game susceptibilities as
χq = 2
∂nH
∂q
with q = C, V. (39)
Resource Susceptibility
The resource susceptibility calculated from Eq. (38) is
χV =
∂mg
∂V
=
e
C
2T cosh
(
C−2V
4T
)
2T
(
sinh2
(
2V−C
4T
)
+ e
C
2T
)3/2 . (40)
In the limit T → 0, χV ∼ exp
(
−T 3
)
for both V → C and
V → 0. At T = 0, χV ∝ V for V → 0 and V → C. At
infinite temperature (T → ∞) χV → 0 due to complete
randomness in strategy selection by players. The plot
for resource susceptibility χV versus resource value V in
Fig. 6(b) shows that net the number transitioning their
strategies has a minima at V = C/2 for all T . The sus-
ceptibility is at a minimum for V = C/2 as it represents
an inflexion point. The resource susceptibility χV is al-
ways positive, implying that the net turnover of players
from Dove to Hawk is higher than the net turnover from
Hawk to Dove. Overall, this implies that fraction of play-
ers playing Hawk increases as resource value increases but
the fraction changing their strategies from dove to hawk
like behavior or vice-versa crucially depends on the value
of the resource.
Cost Susceptibility
The cost susceptibility calculated from Eq. (38) is
χC =
∂mg
∂C
= −
e
C
4T
(
sinh
(
V
2T
)
+ cosh
(
V
2T
))
4T
(
sinh2
(
2V−C
4T
)
+ e
C
2T
)3/2 . (41)
In the limit T → 0, χC ∼ exp
(
−T 2
)
as V → C and
χC → 0 as V → 0. At T = 0, χC ∝ (V − C) for V → C,
and for T → ∞, χC → 0 due to complete randomness
in strategy selection by players, which results in equal
number of Hawks and Doves in the game. The plot of
cost susceptibility χC as a function of injury cost C in
Fig. 7(b) indicates that χC is negative, implying that
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the net turnover from Hawk to Dove is greater than the
turnover from Dove to Hawk. This means that propor-
tion of Dove players increases with increasing cost. Next,
we check for a quantum game.
V. QUANTUM PRISONER’S DILEMMA
The Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma (QPD) game[14–
16] is the quantum version of Prisoner’s dilemma wherein
players are each assigned a qubit, which is in a superpo-
sition of states |C〉 and |D〉, represented in 2D Hilbert
space as
|C〉 =
[
1
0
]
; |D〉 =
[
0
1
]
. (42)
|C〉 and |D〉 represent states of cooperation and defection
respectively in analogy with the classical PD game. The
strategy to be employed by each player is given by unitary
operator U(θ, φ), as
U(θ, φ) =
[
eiφ cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
− sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
]
. (43)
Here, θ ∈ [0, pi] and φ ∈ [0, pi/2]. The classical operations
of cooperate and defect can be represented as U(0, 0) = I
and U(0, pi) = X respectively (I is identity matrix while
X = σx is the Pauli matrix). Before players are allowed
to operate their strategies on their respective qubits, their
respective qubits are entangled by entanglement operator
J (γ). It is given by
J (γ) = cos
(γ
2
)
I ⊗ I + i sin
(γ
2
)
Y ⊗ Y. (44)
where Y = iσy. The game begins by letting both play-
ers (say A and B) have a qubit of their own, in |C〉
state. Next, the entangling operator J (γ) acts upon both
qubits to entangle them. After this, both players choose a
operator U and apply it to their qubit. Finally, before the
qubits are measured, a disentangling operator J†(γ) is
applied to the entangled state and payoffs are calculated
via taking inner product of states |CC〉 , |DC〉 , |CD〉 and
|DD〉 with the final state |ψf 〉, and multiplying with cor-
responding classical payoffs for states, we have payoffs for
players A ($A) and B ($B) as
$A = rPCC + pPDD + tPDC + sPCD, (45)
and, $B = rPCC + pPDD + sPDC + tPCD, (46)
where, PCC = | 〈CC|ψf 〉 |
2, PCD = | 〈CD|ψf 〉 |
2, PDC =
| 〈DC|ψf 〉 |
2, and PDD = | 〈DD|ψf 〉 |
2, |ψf 〉 being final
state of the qubits after execution of game. One can
also have a quantum operator Q = iZ, where Z = σz.
The strategy Q or the quantum strategy is offered to the
players in the quantum Prisoner’s dilemma (QPD) as an
alternative to the classical strategies of cooperate or de-
fect. In terms of Pauli matrices: cooperate(C) is Identity
while defect(D) is σx and quantum is iσz = e
ipi2 σz. Thus
while the quantum superposition state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉)
is invariant under classical strategies like cooperate I or
defect σx, action of quantum strategy Q on |+〉 gives
the orthogonal |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) state multiplied by a
global phase of pi/2.
Thus, for QPD game including both classical and quan-
tum strategies, the payoff matrix is
G =


C D Q
C r, r s, t l1, l1
D t, s p, p l3, l2
Q l1, l1 l2, l3 r, r

 , (47)
where l1 = r cos
2(γ)+ p sin2(γ), l2 = s cos
2(γ)+ t sin2(γ)
and l3 = t cos
2(γ) + s sin2(γ). When entanglement be-
tween players is maximal (γ = pi/2), the payoff matrix
with r = 3, s = 0, p = 1 and t = 5 becomes
G =


C D Q
C 3, 3 0, 5 1, 1
D 5, 0 1, 1 0, 5
Q 1, 1 5, 0 3, 3

 , (48)
and Nash equilibrium is the quantum strategy (Q,Q)
with a payoff of (3,3) for each player. For extending the
game to thermodynamic limit by mapping to Ising model,
we must perform some modifications to game setup to in-
corporate entanglement between players. Each site in the
Ising chain is occupied by two players who play a two-
player QPD. Each site interacts with its nearest-neighbor
site via classical coupling J . The sites in Ising chain
are influenced by equivalent external factor h to behave
similarly. A schematic to understand the setup of QPD
in thermodynamic limit is given in Fig. 8. Now, QPD
Figure 8: Extending the Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma
to thermodynamic limit. Each site (ellipse) consists of
two players who play the two-player quantum prisoner’s
dilemma. The sites are connected via coupling J and all
the sites are influenced by the external field h.
game is a 3-strategy game. However, there exists no
meaningful and consistent method to map a 3-strategy
social dilemma game to an analytically solvable spin-1
Ising model to , i.e., an Ising model for spin-1 states
(0,1,-1).. Hence, we decided to split the QPD into two
sub-problems to better understand the advantages of the
quantum strategy against the classical strategies of coop-
erate and defect. Further, since magnetization in Ising
model compares the fraction of up spins with the number
of down spins in the chain, we break the payoff matrix
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of the QPD(47) into 2× 2 matrix such that the quantum
strategy can be compared against a classical strategy.
So, we have two cases for the QPD, Quantum vs. Co-
operate and Quantum vs. Defect case[17]. The case of
Quantum vs. Cooperate has payoff matrix given as -
G =

 Q CQ r r cos2(γ) + p sin2(γ)
C r cos2(γ) + p sin2(γ) r

 .
(49)
Using a method similar to derivation of Eq. (22), we ob-
tain relations for the ’J ’ and ’h’ as
J =
(r − p) sin2(γ)
2
and h = 0. (50)
It follows from here that corresponding susceptibilities
are zero for Quantum vs. Cooperate. Hence, we do not
further analyze this case and concentrate on the Quan-
tum vs. Defect case in the thermodynamic limit. For
case of Quantum vs. Defect case, corresponding reduced
payoff matrix is given as
G =

 Q DQ r s cos2(γ) + t sin2(γ)
D t cos2(γ) + s sin2(γ) p

 .(51)
We derive the ’J ’, ’h’ relations by using a similar proce-
dure as used in Section II B as
J =
r + p− t− s
4
and h =
r − p+ (s− t) cos(2γ)
4
.(52)
The game magnetization for the Quantum vs. Defect is
then
mg =
sinh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
√
sinh2
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
+ e
−p−r+s+t
T
. (53)
From expression of game magnetization, we find that
Figure 9: Variation of magnetization as a function of
entanglement γ. Here, r = 3, s = 0, p = 1, t = 5
magnetization switches from negative to positive as en-
tanglement increases. The transition from the ”quan-
tum“ to ”defect” occurs at
γ0 =
1
2
arccos
r − p
t− s
. (54)
Now, γ0 ≈ 0.579 for r = 3, s = 0, p = 1 and t = 5
as shown in(9) and is independent of T . It should be
however, noted that γ0 does not mark a point of phase
transition as neither the magnetization is discontinuous
there, nor is it accompanied by any form of divergent
susceptibility, as will be seen in Section VI. For the range
of payoffs of 0 ≤ s < 1, 1 ≤ p < 3, 3 ≤ r < 5, 5 ≤ t < 7,
the point of transition γ0 lies in the range (0, pi/4).
The game susceptibilities for QPD are derived by tak-
ing derivative of gamemagnetizationmg with each of four
payoff parameters. The susceptibilities for QPD are pro-
portional to the net turnover fraction of quantum players,
i.e., χk = 2
∂nQ
∂k where k can be either r, s, t, p and nC is
the fraction of cooperators. We do not define any sus-
ceptibility for entanglement parameter γ as entanglement
among the qubits is not controlled by players’ actions but
is introduced via the game setup. Further, when entan-
glement γ is zero, the game becomes equivalent to the
classical Prisoner’s Dilemma.
VI. SUSCEPTIBILITY IN THERMODYNAMIC
LIMIT OF QUANTUM PRISONER’S DILEMMA
We analyze the four susceptibilities as a function of
four payoffs as well as entanglement in this section. In
this game, the four susceptibilities are defined in same
manner as susceptibilities defined in III B. We analyze
the susceptibilities at finite temperature in Sections VIA
to VID. The special case of T → 0 and T →∞ case are
analyzed inVI E.
A. Reward Susceptibility
The reward susceptibility for QPD calculated from53
is
χr =
∂mg
∂r =
e
s+t
T (2y+cosh(−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)4T ))
4T
√
y2+e
−p−r+s+t
T
(
e
p+r
T y2+e
s+t
T
) (55)
where y = sinh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
. In Fig. 10(a), we
plot the variation of game magnetization versus reward
r at T = 0.33 for different γ. We observe that majority
of players for γ0 < γ < pi/2 choose quantum over defect
strategy. The plots of reward susceptibility as a function
of reward r is given in Fig. 10(b) for particular values of
entanglement at T = 0.33 while variation of reward sus-
ceptibility versus entanglement γ for specific payoffs is
given in Fig. 10(c) at different game temperatures. From
Fig. 10(b), we observe that increasing reward for higher
entanglement values increases the net fraction of players
who choose quantum strategy as reward susceptibility is
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positive, implying that the net turnover of players from
defect to quantum is higher than the net turnover from
quantum to defect. This implies that fraction of players
selecting a quantum strategy increases, as can be seen
in Fig. 10(a). At maximal entanglement, reward sus-
ceptibility is zero at low T as all players choose quan-
tum strategy as shown in Fig. 10(b). In Fig. 10(c), for
γ < γ0, reward susceptibility is negative implying that
for low values of entanglement, net fraction of players
changing to defect is more while for γ > γ0, the reward
susceptibility is positive, implying that reward promotes
switching to quantum at higher entanglement. At maxi-
mal entanglement, χr → 0 for low T , implying that the
effect of reward on the players becomes negligible. Fur-
ther, there is no phase transition as the susceptibility
does not diverge at any point.
B. Sucker’s Susceptibility
The sucker’s susceptibility for QPD calculated from
Section V is -
χs =
∂mg
∂s
=
e
s+t
T
(
cos(2γ) cosh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
− 2y
)
4T
√
y2 + e
−p−r+s+t
T
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
)(56)
where y = sinh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
. In Fig. 11(a), we ob-
serve that at γ = γ0, the fraction of quantum and defect
population in the game are weakly affected by change
in sucker’s payoff. On the other hand, at maximal en-
tanglement (γ = pi/2), we find that game magnetiza-
tion decreases with increase in sucker’s payoff s, implying
that sucker’s payoff increases the fraction of defectors in
game. The plots of sucker’s susceptibility as a function
of sucker’s payoff s is given in Fig. 11(b) for some values
of entanglement while variation of sucker’s susceptibility
with entanglement γ is given in Fig. 11(c) for different
game temperatures. At γ0 for low T , sucker’s suscepti-
bility is almost zero, as can be seen in Fig. 11(b). This is
so as fraction of quantum and defect players are almost
equal and fixed. At maximum entanglement, sucker’s
susceptibility becomes negative and decreases as sucker’s
payoff is increased. This implies that the net turnover
from quantum to defect is higher than vice-versa, which
increases proportion of defectors. In Fig. 11(c), for
γ < γ0, sucker’s susceptibility is positive, implying that
at low entanglement, change in sucker’s payoff promotes
players to select quantum, while for γ > γ0, sucker’s sus-
ceptibility transitions to negative values, implying that
sucker’s payoff at higher entanglement, makes players se-
lect defect over quantum strategy. At maximal entan-
glement, the effect of sucker’s payoff on players is non-
existent at low T . Further, there is no phase transition
in the game at finite T as susceptibility does not diverge
at any value of entanglement.
C. Temptation Susceptibility
The temptation susceptibility for QPD calculated from
Section V is
χt =
∂mg
∂t
= −
e
s+t
T
(
2y + cos(2γ) cosh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
))
4T
√
y2 + e
−p−r+s+t
T
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
) ,(57)
where y = sinh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
. The game mag-
netization as a function of temptation t at game tem-
perature T = 0.33 for different entanglement values is
given in Fig. 12(c). We observe that at γ = γ0, the
game magnetization(mg) is nearly constant in response
to change in temptation t while at γ = pi/2, i.e., maxi-
mal entanglement, mg decreases slightly as temptation
increases, implying that temptation aids the defector
population. The plots of temptation susceptibility as a
function of temptation t is given in Fig. 12(b) for some
entanglement values while variation of temptation sus-
ceptibility with entanglement γ is shown in Fig. 12(c) for
particular game temperatures T . In Fig. 12(b), we ob-
serve that temptation susceptibility at entanglement γ0
is weakly dependent on temptation t. At maximal en-
tanglement, however, temptation susceptibility is nega-
tive and decreases as temptation increases, implying that
fraction of defectors increases as temptation is increased.
In Fig. 12(c), for γ < γ0, players prefer to switch to
quantum as temptation susceptibility is positive, while
for γ > γ0, players switch to defect preferentially as
temptation susceptibility becomes zero at maximal en-
tanglement, implying players are not influenced by temp-
tation. For low T , temptation susceptibility becomes zero
at maximal entanglement, implying that players are not
influenced by temptation. There is no phase transition
involved for finite T since susceptibility does not diverge
for any value of γ.
D. Punishment Susceptibility
The punishment susceptibility for QPD calculated
from Eq. (53) is
χp =
∂mg
∂p
= −
e
s+t
T
(
cosh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
− 2y
)
4T
√
y2 + e
−p−r+s+t
T
(
e
p+r
T y2 + e
s+t
T
)(58)
where y = sinh
(
−p+r+cos(2γ)(s−t)
4T
)
. The game magne-
tization mg versus the punishment p for T = 0.33 and
at different entanglement values is shown in Fig. 13(a).
We observe that at γ = γ0, punishment promotes the
population of defectors in the game. At maximal en-
tanglement, punishment has no effect on the players in
the game as game magnetization is constant. Plots for
punishment susceptibility as function of punishment p
are given in Fig. 13(b) for some values of entanglement
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Figure 10: Plot of game magnetization (a) and reward susceptibility (b) as a function of reward r for different values
of entanglement γ at game temperature T = 0.33 (payoffs: T = 0.33, s = 0, t = 5 & p = 1).(c) Plot of reward
susceptibility χr versus entanglement γ (payoffs: r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 & p = 1).
Figure 11: Plot of game magnetization(a) and sucker’s susceptibility (b) as a function of sucker’s payoff s for
different values of entanglement γ at T = 0.33, (payoffs: r = 3, t = 5 & p = 1). (c) Plot of sucker’s susceptibility χs
versus entanglement γ (payoffs: r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 & p = 1).
while variation of punishment susceptibility with entan-
glement γ is given in Fig. 13(c) for some game tempera-
tures. We observe from Fig. 13(b) that punishment sus-
ceptibility is negative at entanglement γ0, implying that
net turnover of players from quantum to defect is more
than vice-versa. At maximal entanglement, punishment
does not affect players as punishment susceptibility is
zero. In Fig. 13(c), punishment susceptibility is positive
for γ > γ0, implying punishment p promotes transition
to quantum strategy. On the other hand, in the domain
γ < γ0, punishment susceptibility is negative, implying
that at low entanglement, punishment induces players to
defect. The finiteness of susceptibility for all entangle-
ment γ implies the absence of a phase transition in the
game. In the next section, we look at the susceptibilities
and the magnetization in the zero temperature limit.
E. Payoff susceptibilities in QPD for T → 0 and
T → ∞ limit.
In the previous four subsections, we have analyzed the
payoff susceptibilities in case of QPD for a wide range of
parameters. We have explicitly looked at both low and
high T in case of Fig. 10(c), 11(c), 12(c) and 13(c). In
the limit T → ∞, we find that all four susceptibilities
reduce to zero. This is because the players select their
strategies at random which leads to net zero turnover of
players switching their strategies.
Plotting the game magnetization in Fig. 14(a) in the
limit T → 0, we observe that there are two transition
points, where the magnetization of the game changes. At
entanglement γ1, we find that the magnetization changes
from −1 to 0, while at γ2, we observe the magnetiza-
tion change from 0 to +1, with γ1 < γ2. Accordingly,
we have three phases in the game, namely, the classical
phase which exists for 0 < γ < γ1 in which the classical
coupling dominates the choice of players and influences
players to choose defect. The second phase exists for the
entanglement range of γ1 < γ < γ2. In this phase, the
influence of classical coupling between sites and the en-
tanglement at a site completely cancel each other out,
which leads to players selecting their strategies at ran-
dom. The third phase exists in the range γ2 < γ < pi/2
in which the strategy selection in governed by the en-
tanglement, which influences players to select quantum
strategy. Since the game magnetization curve is discon-
tinuous at γ1 and γ2 for T → 0, we find that all four sus-
ceptibilities diverge for these two points identically. The
phase transition is second-order as the susceptibility in
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Figure 12: Plot of game magnetization(a) and temptation susceptibility(b) as a function of temptation t for different
values of entanglement γ at T = 0.33 (payoffs: r = 3, s = 0 & p = 1).(c) Plot of temptation susceptibility χt versus
entanglement γ (payoffs: r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 & p = 1).
Figure 13: Plot of game magnetization(a) and punishment susceptibility (b) as a function of punishment p for
different values of entanglement γ at T = 0.33 (payoffs: r = 3, s = 0 & t = 5).(c) Plot of punishment susceptibility
χp versus entanglement γ (payoffs: r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 & p = 1).
the game diverges at γ1 and γ2 [8, 18]. The phase transi-
tion is similar to the ferromagnet-paramagnet phase tran-
sition and the superconductor-normal metal phase tran-
sition as the magnetic susceptibility diverges near the
critical points, similar to divergence of game susceptibil-
ities near the critical entanglement[3].
To find an analytic expression for γ1 and γ2, we solve
the equation
sinh2
(
r − p+ cos(2γ)(s− t)
4T
)
= exp
(
s+ t− r − p
T
)
(59)
for γ while ensuring that the condition t > r > p > s
holds. Eq. (59) can be obtained from either magnetiza-
tion(53) or the susceptibility expressions (55,56,57) and
(58). The analytic forms for γ1 and γ2 are
γ1 =
1
2
arccos
(
3p+ r − 2(s+ t)
s− t
)
, (60)
and γ2 =
1
2
arccos
(
3r − p+ 2(s− t)
s− t
)
. (61)
with γ1 ≈ 0.321 and γ2 ≈ 0.785 in Figs. 14(a) and 14(b)
respectively. The solutions of Eq. (59) are valid as long as
the condition p+ r < s+ t is satisfied. This provides the
condition for the existence of random phase in the game.
If the condition p+ r < s+ t is not satisfied, then there
are only two phases in the game, namely the defect phase
which exists for 0 < γ < γ0 and quantum phase, which
exists for γ0 < γ < pi/2, where γ0 is the point of phase
transition at T → 0 has been defined in Eq. (54), an ex-
ample for which has been plotted in Fig. 14(c). γ0 is the
point of phase transition only at T → 0 since magnetiza-
tion becomes discontinuous only at T → 0, which is the
hallmark of a phase transition[8, 18]. For all other finite
temperatures, γ0 marks the point of transition where the
dominant strategy of the game changes.
Analogy with type-II superconductors
At T → 0, we observe two second order phase tran-
sitions for the QPD, this is similar to what is seen in
type-II superconductors below the critical temperature
Tc[4, 5]. The quantum phase in the QPD game exist-
ing between γ > γ2 can be compared with the Meiss-
ner phase of the type-II superconductor which is formed
for external fields H < Hc1. The vortex phase of the
superconductors between Hc1 < H < Hc2 can be com-
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Figure 14: Plot of (a) game magnetization and (b) punishment susceptibility versus entanglement γ in the T → 0
limit. (All the other susceptibilities (reward, sucker’s and temptation) show identical behavior to punishment
susceptibility.) Here, r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 and p = 1. (c) plots the punishment susceptibility and the game
magnetization for a case where the random phase does not exist. Here, r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 and p = 2.
pared with the random phase of the QPD game between
γ1 < γ < γ2. The normal phase of the type-II super-
conductor existing for H > Hc2 can be compared to the
classical phase of QPD existing between 0 < γ < γ1. The
condition for the vortex phase in type-II superconductor
to exist is for the Ginzburg-Landau parameter κ > 1√
2
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while the condition on the payoffs for the random phase
of QPD to exist is p+ r < s+ t. If the condition for the
presence of the random phase in QPD is not maintained,
then we find that there are two phases in the game with
a phase transition at γ0, which is similar to the phase
transition of a type-I superconductor at Tc in zero exter-
nal field (H = 0). But unlike the magnetic susceptibility
χ = −1/4pi in the Meissner phase, we find that the sus-
ceptibilities of the QPD game are zero in the quantum
phase.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed thermodynamic sus-
ceptibility in context of infinite player social dilemmas
like Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hawk-Dove game and quantum
prisoner’s dilemma. The infinite player game is con-
structed by mapping two-player game to spin-1/2 Ising
model and then defining thermodynamic functions for in-
finite player game analogous to Ising model. The suscep-
tibility for game is a effectively a measure of the turnover
of players from one strategy to other in a game. The
susceptibilities in context of game provide us with net
change in player strategies, with the sign of susceptibil-
ity suggesting strategy players prefer to switch to.
In Prisoner’s Dilemma, we find that the turnover of
players switching to cooperate strategy is positive for
sucker’s payoff and temptation, even though majority of
players choose to defect. The turnover in the context
of reward susceptibility is highly dependent on the game
temperature(T ), while for punishment susceptibility, we
find the net turnover of players preferring to switch to
defect is dominant. In Hawk-Dove game, we find that
the net turnover of players switching to Hawk is positive,
in response to change in resource value, while turnover
of players changing to Hawk is negative as cost of injury
increases, implying that players prefer to switch to Dove
strategy.
In quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we compare
quantum to defect strategy. At finite game tempera-
ture (T 6= 0), we find that the net turnover of players
switching to quantum strategy is positive in response to
reward and punishment at higher entanglement. But at
maximal entanglement, punishment and reward both do
not influence players as corresponding susceptibilities are
zero for low T . On the other hand, net turnover of play-
ers switching to quantum strategy is positive for sucker’s
payoff and temptation at lower entanglement. Increasing
entanglement, causes temptation and sucker’s suscepti-
bility to become negative, implying that at higher entan-
glements, players prefer to switch to defect strategy. At
maximal entanglement, we find that sucker’s and tempta-
tion susceptibility becomes zero at low T , implying that
entanglement inhibits players from switching their strate-
gies.
In the T → 0 limit, we find that QPD has two second-
order transitions, namely from all defect to random selec-
tion of strategies and from random selection to all quan-
tum. This change in the Nash equilibrium for the game
in response to entanglement is marked by a divergence in
the susceptibilities at those transitions. We finally show
the analogy of this behavior with the behavior seen in
type-II superconductors. Finally what is the main take
home message of our work? The main message is two
fold: one the susceptibility gives microscopic change in
behavior of the players as compared to the macroscopic
behavior understood from the magnetization. Second to
identify and characterize phase transitions in the game.
We introduced the idea of susceptibility for the games
in an attempt to better understand if there is any possi-
bility of a phase transition in the game. We have tried to
illustrate by means of examples, in fact we can observe
telltale signs of such phase transitions in the Quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Entanglement in Quantum Pris-
oners Dilemma (QPD) has a non-trivial role in deter-
16
mining the behavior of thermodynamic susceptibility. In
the zero-temperature limit, we find that there are two
second-order phase transitions in the quantum prisoner’s
dilemma game, marked by a divergence in the suscep-
tibility. This behavior is similar to that seen in Type-
II superconductors wherein also two second-order phase
transitions are seen.
VIII. DATA AVAILABILITY
Data available in article-The data that supports the
findings of this study are available within the article.
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